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Artist as Creator: John Ruskin's Modern Painters III-V

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Introduction

In my previous paper⁽¹⁾, I examined how the Victorian art critic John Ruskin (1819–1900) positioned the simple act of "seeing" in his famous work *Modern Painters*. "Seeing" was always an important part of Ruskin's views, but one must pay special attention to the meaning of the word. Before it becomes the act of the viewer, who is most often thought of as seeing, it is first an act of the artist as creator, meaning that the act has two different sides, the ideas behind which are very different.

Within the double-sided nature of engaging with art, through the roles of viewer and maker, Ruskin believed that both roles blended with the other. He himself was a viewer as a critic, but also a maker, and even produced works himself as an amateur artist. Within *Modern Painters* he often references his own experience as a maker, and sections of the work even exist as instruction on how to look at natural phenomena and then reproduce them through painting. Within his own aesthetics, he also explained that an artist must first view nature faithfully before attempting to recreate it through invention. Above all, he noted that the nature which must be most faithfully followed was that made by the greatest of all creators, God.

Thus, Ruskin believed there was a similar relationship between nature, the creations of God, and artistic creations (landscapes, to be precise), and that through the observation of nature the artist can come to know the heart of God, just as the viewer can come to know the heart of the artist by viewing their work. Creation and appreciation, making and viewing; in order for them to realize this relationship, both must exist as two halves of a whole. In this paper, I would like to shine a light on the above relationship largely through the narratives of *Modern Painters* III (1856), IV (1856), and V (1860).

1 The Seer

The act of "seeing" for a truly great artist is not just to grasp both the superficial aspect and the true nature of a real thing altogether, but also to feel as a whole the entire network of relations which bring it into being. This process then becomes the same as acknowledging that experience is consciousness formed from our perception of external things. In this sense, DeSylva, who wrote based solely on *Modern Painters* I (1843) and II (1846), was correct, as he said that for Ruskin, the duality of the thing which a painter sees and represents is brought under control in an intentionally

phenomenological manner⁽²⁾. The awareness presented there is still centered on objective things, which agrees with standard epistemology, but after *Modern Painters* III the focus shifts to the creation of genius. This ability to use consciousness to create a body of knowledge and experience from the materials provided by the senses, which was already seen within the contemplative imagination, is the basis for the goal of the artist, which is to take the emotions they have received from these experiences and then transfer them to a different person so that they might understand each other. The artist leads the viewer, and borrowing their imagination, the artist can then become the eyes of that viewer and show them something that they have never seen themselves.

To the great imaginative painter—greater a million times in every faculty of soul than we—our word may wisely be, "Come between this nature and me—this nature which is too great and too wonderful for me; temper it for me, interpret it to me; let me see with your eyes, and hear with your ears, and have help and strength from your great spirit. (5:187)

This ability to see, which exists only in the greatest of artists and which even they are unaware of but is inescapable to them, takes on the shape of invention. In the end, this idea of Ruskin's which ties together the notion of truly seeing and creating exists primarily as a visual sense born from imagination. That is to say, "while the highest art is purely imaginative, all its materials being wrought into their form by invention" (5:65). The artist who possesses this sense has received a God-like ability for creation. Ruskin believed that the most important element of a creator's style was whether a work was created by someone in a state of enthusiasm, which would suggest that he may have been aware of the word's Greek roots as well. The last and greatest of the senses is this possession which would guide the artist and move them like a kind of oracle. In Modern Painters III, Ruskin arrived more at the idea of the sense of being able to see versus just viewing, and his description of these senses clearly surpasses that of the decadent visionary and seer. Hofstätter stated that the meaning of painting had changed at the end of the 19th century, saying "the picture is no longer a representation, no longer a window-like 'view' of a natural reality, but an event."(3) He also said, "this event takes place each time the viewer encounters the picture. [.....] But the image only becomes a place of manifestation if it has also 'manifested' to the artist, i.e. it has been painted from the imagination and not according to a model." (4) For Ruskin as well, the image created through imagination and invention can be experienced by the viewer through the viewer's imagination, but the invention itself which gives birth to this manifestation is something unexplainable which cannot be shared with another.

Now invention in art signifies an arrangement, in which everything in the work is thus consistent with all things else, and helpful to all else. It is the greatest and rarest of all the qualities of art. The power by which it is effected is absolutely inexplicable and incommunicable; but exercised with entire facility by those who possess it, in many cases even unconsciously. (7:208–209)

This is why, "if you do not feel it, no one can by reasoning make you feel it" (7:210). However, for an artist who sees through their invention, there can be no doubt that they see concretely. If that person does not see the vision's existence as real, it can't really be said that they've seen it.

All the great men *see* what they paint before they paint it,—see it in a perfectly passive manner,—cannot help seeing it if they would; whether in their mind's eye, or in bodily fact, does not matter; very often the mental vision is, I believe, in men of imagination, clearer than the bodily one; [......] And the whole power, whether of painter or poet, to describe rightly what we call an ideal thing, depends upon its being thus, to him, not an ideal, but a *real* thing. (5:114)

How the artist saw a thing, or what they saw is almost less important than the fact that as long as the sight that came to that person is the truth for them, then the responsibility of the artist is to adhere to what they saw, express it in their painting, and allow those who see their piece to have the same experience. "The duty of an artist is not only to address and awaken, but to guide the imagination; and there is no safe guidance but that of simple concurrence with fact" (5:179). Of course, this fact is the fact as experienced by the artist. Of less importance is the idea of creating something as beautiful as possible. This is the end of distinguishing between the truth of nature which can be found through observation, and the beauty of nature which can be found by feeling with the heart. Those were necessary things for artists who did not have invention. The first thing they need to do is to quietly face the facts of reality. "But if a painter has inventive power he is to treat his subject in a totally different way; giving not the actual facts of it, but the impression it made on his mind" (6:32). Within invention, which is a higher form of imagination, the truth and beauty of nature are one and the same, which is to be grasped quickly, without losing the impression of the experience as a whole, and which appears in the most perfect order. Invention "must be the involuntary occurrence of certain forms or fancies to the mind in the order they are to be portrayed" (5:119). This vision can be likened to a dream that can't be changed by the person in question.

The vision comes to him in its chosen order. Chosen *for* him, not *by* him, but yet full of visible and exquisite choice, just as a sweet and perfect dream will come to a sweet and perfect person, so that, in some sense, they may be said to have chosen their dream, or composed it; and yet they could not help dreaming it so, and in no otherwise. Thus, exactly thus, in all results of true inventive power, the whole

harmony of the thing done seems as if it had been wrought by the most exquisite rules. But to him who did it, it presented itself so, and his will, and knowledge, and personality, for the moment went for nothing; he became simply a scribe, and wrote what he heard and saw. (5:118)

Painters can't resist this dream, or the "event" noted by Hofstätter. "In general, when the imagination is at all noble, it is irresistible" (6:29), but that is, of course, also true of invention. Moreover, when ideas are conceived through invention, the painter cannot willfully control their invention to create dreams. "If visions of unreal things present themselves to him with or without his own will, praying to be painted, quite ungovernable in their coming or going,—neither to be summoned if they do not choose to come, nor banished if they do,—he has invention" (6:28). The painter is powerless, unable to control this process.

Therefore, when he looks with his invention, he is not a being with an independent ego. The subject and objects that he sees are actually representations of the internalized impressions he holds. His state of mind is like that of a priestess serving as an oracle for a god. "It follows from all this, evidently, that a great idealist never can be egotistic. The whole of his power depends upon his losing sight and feeling of his own existence, and becoming a mere witness and mirror of truth, and a scribe of visions,—always passive in sight, passive in utterance,—lamenting continually that he cannot completely reflect nor clearly utter all he has seen—not by any means a proud state for a man to be in" (5:125). However, even if he is in such a passive slave–state, this is still due to the unique talent given to him and not to others and is an expression of the refinement of his spirit. "That greatness in art (as assuredly in all other things, but more distinctly in this than in most of them) is not a teachable nor gainable thing, but the expression of a mind of a God-made great man" (5:189). At the same time, the existence of this talent is decisively divided between nature and art, and it gives value to the latter, which is not possible solely through the former.

In these various differences from reality it [=the picture] becomes the expression of the power and intelligence of a companionable human soul. In all this choice, arrangement, penetrative sight, and kindly guidance, we recognize a supernatural operation, and perceive, not merely the landscape or incident as in a mirror; but, besides, the presence of what, after all, may perhaps be the most wonderful piece of divine work in the whole matter—the great human spirit through which it is manifested to us. (5:187)

This moment is when the truly refined spirit of the artist is revealed, fulfilling the second purpose of landscape painting, which is to allow us to experience the spirit of the artist. Much like the morality of this appreciation of art, when the artist is engaged

in creation this talent cannot be the object of pride, and the artist must instead pour themselves into holding a deep affinity and love for their subject and receive inspiration through their invention, that is to say, they must apply all of their own moral emotions to the process of creation.

If he is working with hearty love of the place, earnest desire to be faithful to it, and yet an open heart for every fancy that Heaven sends him, in that precise degree his work will be great and good. (6:47)

For the artist to receive and recreate this vision, even if he is painting a landscape, he must move beyond the truth and beauty of the nature in front of him and make use of the impressions of his experience and his imaginative truth. Ruskin also wrote, "only the imaginative truth is precious" (6:44–45).

First, he receives a true impression from the place itself, and takes care to keep hold of that as his chief good; indeed, he needs no care in the matter, for the distinction of his mind from that of others consists in his instantly receiving such sensations strongly, and being unable to lose them; and then he sets himself as far as possible to reproduce that impression on the mind of the spectator of his picture. (6:33)

And the aim of the great inventive landscape painter must be to give the far higher and deeper truth of mental vision, rather than that of the physical facts, and to reach a representation which, though it may be totally useless to engineers or geographers, and, when tried by rule and measure, totally unlike the place, shall yet be capable of producing on the far-away beholder's mind precisely the impression which the reality would have produced, and putting his heart into the same state in which it would have been, had he verily descended into the valley from the gorges of Airolo. (6:35–36)

To express the painter's imaginative truth and to show what he experienced, Ruskin did think it was acceptable to stray from exactly replicating nature. However, this could not be forced through thought or action. Invention leads painters in the correct direction within their work. Ruskin also emphasizes that this is akin to a dream.

But, strictly speaking, he does not think at all. If he thought, he would instantly go wrong; it is only the clumsy and uninventive artist who thinks. All these changes come into his head involuntarily; an entirely imperative dream, crying, "Thus it must be," has taken possession of him; he can see, and do, no otherwise than as the dream directs. (6:38)

Painters who follow these dreams become tools to show people the truth like mirrors, as Ruskin mentions in *Modern Painters* III.

[The imagination is] all the more truth-telling, because in *its* work, the vanity and individualism of the man himself are crushed, and he becomes a mere instrument or mirror, used by a higher power for the reflection to others of a truth which no effort of his could ever have ascertained. (6:44)

Those who see with invention are "seeing" in the truest sense of the word. For Ruskin, the act of seeing was something to be done with the heart and the whole spirit, not just with the eyes. "The true Seer always feels as intensely as any one else" (5:334). Those who can speak simply of the things they felt and saw in dreams without being overtaken with emotion and those who can make others feel that same emotion are truly the most excellent of artists and humans. Speaking of J. M. W. Turner and Sir Walter Scott, Ruskin says:

Then, as touching the kind of work done by these two men, the more I think of it I find this conclusion more impressed upon me,—that the greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world is to *see* something, and tell what it *saw* in a plain way. Hundreds of people can talk for one who can think, but thousands can think for one who can see. To see clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion,—all in one. (5:333)

Thus, for Ruskin, "seeing" moves from simply looking at nature to looking with the soul, and finally to being able to take the position of the Seer. While "seeing" may seem universal, here it is defined as something special, and possible only for one seer out of hundreds of thousands of people. If this act is what it is to be a seer, it is clear that the act is prophetic and has religious significance. But then, what is "poetry"?

2 Poiēsis

Ruskin viewed painting and poetry as sister arts, which makes it unsurprising that he was the only critic to take quick notice when Turner began including poems with his painted works. However, it must also be noted that his attitude toward poems was unique among those championing painting at the time. For Ruskin, poetry was a familiar art that had been around since he was young, but many middle-class people at the time were much more familiar with literature than painting. Although the Royal Academy existed, the popularity of literature still exceeded that of painting. Part of the intent behind the writing of *Modern Painters* was to make painting as familiar to the general public as literature.

According to Landow, "like most writers who allied arts in order to defend painting, Ruskin stressed its ability to convey information in the service of religion and morality. Unlike most who had preceded him, he did not defend painting on the ground that, like poetry, it educates and entertains by imitating nature." (5) As discussed in my separate papers (6), Ruskin preached faithfulness to nature but disliked simple imitations in

painting. What he truly wanted was not a copy of nature, but an expression of the truth captured by the imagination of the painter, through which the painter's emotions and the truth they saw could be felt. For Ruskin, art had to be a product of the spirit. With the principles of poetry like Sir Joshua Reynolds', which were following 18th-century rules or imitating ancient forms, Ruskin was not able to defend both poetry and painting. Following the principles of painting he had established, he needed to define a sort of poem which would use imagination to tie together higher emotions and appeal to the imaginations of others to evoke emotion within them.

I come, after some embarrassment, to the conclusion, that poetry is "the suggestion, by the imagination, of noble grounds for the noble emotions." I mean, by the noble emotions, those four principal sacred passions—Love, Veneration, Admiration, and Joy (this latter especially, if unselfish); and their opposites—Hatred, Indignation (or Scorn), Horror, and Grief,—this last, when unselfish, becoming Compassion. These passions in their various combinations constitute what is called "poetical feeling," when they are felt on noble grounds, that is, on great and true grounds. (5:28)

For Ruskin, emotion is nothing more than proof of humanity. Like the relationship between the artist and the viewer through art, he believed that this emotion and the workings of the heart are necessary for humans to understand each other's true selves. In *Sesame and Lilies* (1865) Ruskin speaks of understanding between people made possible through reading, and of the necessity of emotions and the heart in this sense.

Having then faithfully listened to the great teachers, that you may enter into their Thoughts, you have yet this higher advance to make;—you have to enter into their Hearts. As you go to them first for clear sight, so you must stay with them, that you may share at last their just and mighty Passion. Passion, or —"sensation." (18:78)

This is thought to be an interpretation of the two functions of the landscape painter, applied to the role of the reader in literature. In regard to reading, he says, "whatever bit of a wise man's work is honestly and benevolently done, that bit is his book or his piece of art" (18:61), and how he relates books and works of art also supports this comparison.

On the other hand, poetical feelings are not enough to constitute poetry. Those feelings must be assembled with invention in a way that evokes them.

Farther, it is necessary to the existence of poetry that the grounds of these feelings should be *furnished by the imagination*. Poetical feeling, that is to say, mere noble emotion, is not poetry. It is happily inherent in all human nature deserving the name, and is found often to be purest in the least sophisticated. But the power of assembling,

by the help of the imagination, such images as will excite these feelings, is the power of the poet or literally of the "Maker." (5:29)

Ruskin describes this imagination as, "now this power of exciting the emotions depends of course on the richness of the imagination, and on its choice of those images which, in combination, will be most effective, or, for the particular work to be done, most fit" (5:30). When this is at its most powerful, it is apparent that the process is invention itself. Thus, those who create are those who make poems with invention. Poetry is synonymous with creation.

But if he [=the reader] ever come to know true invention from false, he will find that it is not only the highest quality of art, but is simply the most wonderful act or power of humanity. It is pre-eminently the deed of human creation; poihsis, otherwise, poetry. (7:210)

After classifying humans based on their work, Ruskin questions what it is to create by comparing the act to the greatest act of creation, i.e. God's creation, and then turns back to creation by humans by saying the following:

A poet, or creator, is therefore a person who puts things together, not as a watchmaker steel, or a shoemaker leather, but who puts life into them.

His work is essentially this: it is the gathering and arranging of material by imagination, so as to have in it at last the harmony or helpfulness of life, and the passion or emotion of life. (7:215)

The artist who opens their spirit to heavenly inspiration in their own inventions has great value as a creator because they can give life to their work by capturing the authentic whole of a thing.

But, whatever the means used may be, the certainty and directness of them imply absolute grasp of the whole subject, and without this grasp there is no good painting. This, finally, let me declare, without qualification—that partial conception is no conception. The whole picture must be imagined, or none of it is. And this grasp of the whole implies very strange and sublime qualities of mind. It is not possible, unless the feelings are completely under control; [......] Until the feelings can give strength enough to the will to enable it to conquer them, they are not strong enough. (7:248)

According to Huisman, Ruskin "was as passionate about beauty as he was preoccupied with kindness and charity." Ruskin was certainly concerned with emotions and the heart. However, in Chapter 12 "Of the Pathetic Fallacy" of *Modern Painters* III he states

that excessive transfer of emotions should be avoided, and the creator should always be calm. This is modeled after the Creator, who possesses the greatest intelligence. Being an artist, the greatest kind of creator, is inseparable from that person's personality.

Mere cleverness or special gift never made an artist. It is only perfectness of mind, unity, depth, decision,—the highest qualities, in fine, of the intellect, which will form the imagination. (7:249)

In Ruskin's duality, we find that through the convergence of seeing and creating appear the twin aspects of a calm gaze and a warm heart. About Giorgione he says:

I tell you farther, and this fact you may receive trustfully, that his sensibility to human affection and distress was no less keen than even his sense for natural beauty—heart-sight deep as eyesight. (7:377)

Conclusion

Here we have traced changes in the concept of "seeing" contained within *Modern Painters*. Based on the scientific observation of nature which formed the foundation of Ruskin's critiques, his views also reflected his deep love of nature, and were always supported by the idea of feeling with the heart. When looking becomes "seeing", and only in the case of those with a harmonious spirit is creation possible.

Perception and judgment skills alone are not enough for painting. The true path of the heart requires the artist's spirit to take hold of the spirit of nature and for the viewer to then experience the spirit of nature and that of the artist with their own spirit. This road can be opened through honesty and love. The act of seeing is supported invisibly, not by intellect or the senses, but by morality.

With this kind of bodily sensibility to colour and form is intimately connected that higher sensibility which we revere as one of the chief attributes of all noble minds, and as the chief spring of real poetry. I believe this kind of sensibility may be entirely resolved into the acuteness of bodily sense of which I have been speaking, associated with love, love I mean in its infinite and holy functions, as it embraces divine and human and brutal intelligences, and hallows the physical perception of external objects by association, gratitude, veneration, and other pure feelings of our moral nature. And although the discovery of truth is in itself altogether intellectual, and dependent merely on our powers of physical perception and abstract intellect, wholly independent of our moral nature, yet these instruments (perception and judgment) are so sharpened and brightened, and so far more swiftly and effectively used, when they have the energy and passion of our moral nature to bring them into action—perception is so quickened by love, and judgment so tempered by veneration, that, practically, a

man of deadened moral sensation is always dull in his perception of truth. (3:142-143)

Ruskin was thus guided by Christian ethics when he talked about the spiritual and moral values of art. This deeply religious view of art ethics in *Modern Painters* V that the spirit of a good person is reflected in their art, was the very first thing Walter Pater set about erasing⁽⁸⁾, but the idea still has a great deal of influence on us today.

As seen in *Modern Painters*, the correlation between society and culture, including art, which is more clearly shown in *The Stones of Venice*, is an extension of this ethical view. However, Ruskin also regarded the Renaissance culture as a corruption of the Gothic and blamed it for the corruption of religious beliefs held by the people of that time. Regardless of the pros and cons of this view, it can be acknowledged that within the culture they create, there is a close and influential relationship between external factors influencing the individual. For instance, the era, communal societal structures including politics, religion, and economy, and geographical conditions, and prominent spiritual activities of individuality, such as thought, science, and art, which are based on these conditions.

Acknowledging this also means realizing that it's a difficult thing to see the connection between where we have been placed and the art we create. This is because the observation point from which we see is within this world and society, necessitating that we constantly re-examine our values that are already fully immersed in this society. The things which are so obvious and familiar as to be invisible are precisely the true form of society and culture. To understand where we are, we must look down at our own feet, back at the road on which we travel, and re-examine the path that we think we know so well.

Ruskin found the direction his society was taking, reflected in the Venice of the past in The Stones of Venice. He used the past opulence of the port city of Venice and its subsequent decline to warn against the possible future he saw for the Britain in which he lived. When we look back at Ruskin's era, it is the same as when Ruskin looked back at Venice during the Renaissance, and it is useful to consider the movement of the times and traditions of the past. It is possible to understand the direction things were moving as we can see eras which came after, which he never witnessed, and this act is important because it allows us to look at the environment surrounding Ruskin and its relationship to his critique, which can give us an overall picture of the era, and re-examine it as a past which connects to us in the present. Before examining the Theoretic Faculty and imagination, Ruskin claimed that one must desensitize one's self to the spirit of their era. This is the same ethical view which led Ruskin to focus on cultural economics to enrich life for all following the publication of Modern Painters because he was saddened to see the growing gap in wealth within England, and how the poor were ignored. As we continue to develop the technological society which was born in England during Ruskin's era, we find ourselves once again facing the challenge of assigning worth to immaterial values.

This paper supports the questions raised by Ruskin, and reaffirms that the spirit we are overlooking today is at the core of *Modern Painters*. Even Pater and William Morris, successors to Ruskin who at first seem to have ideas which conflict with his, still chose, like Ruskin, to resist rather than live in harmony with the technological society around them. While one chose to appreciate art for art's sake and separate it from religion, and the other focused on the praise of handicraft, at the root of both schools of thought is a Ruskin–esque spirit. Both men also had an area in which they took Ruskin's thoughts to extremes. As a critic, Ruskin was in the position of a viewer, but as an art critic, he was also able to see in the same way as those who were creators. Ruskin despised critics who did not look with their own eyes, saying:

Now none are capable of doing this [=leading the public taste], but those whose principles of judgment are based both on thorough *practical* knowledge of art, and on broad general views of what is true and right, without reference to what has been done at one time or another, or in one school or another. [.....] But such references to former excellence are the only refuge and resource of persons endeavouring to be critics without being artists. (3:618)

So that true criticism of art never can consist in the mere application of rules; it can be just only when it is founded on quick sympathy with the innumerable instincts and changeful efforts of human nature, chastened and guided by unchanging love of all things that God has created to be beautiful, and pronounced to be good. (5:43)

This critic naturally turned his attention to the work, portraying its splendor in beautiful writing and drawing the creator closer to the viewer. Holding both elements, he never lost his grasp on their balance. As Ruskin's ideas around "seeing" changed, he was witnessing the realism of the 19th century, referred to as the "era of observation," romanticism which at its root was a reaction to that movement and the symbolist style of the Voyant. But Ruskin chose not to discount any of these and instead kept them well balanced. Rather, Ruskin could not deviate from his path. This is one of the reasons why he could not accept Whistler's landscapes. Paintings in which the artist devotes themself too heavily to seeing moment by moment rely too much on the imagination of the viewer and disrupt the balance of the painting wherein the maker and the viewer should be standing on equal ground.

When dealing with Ruskin's aesthetics, one should look at the history of English philosophy, the art theories of the Academy and the essays of other critics who were his contemporaries. However, this paper merely traces the development of Ruskin's theory from a simple and faithful perspective. To understand his work, which stands as complex as a magnificent tree, the biggest challenge was to cut away the leaves and

branches, leaving behind the essential skeleton. While I do not feel the task has been fulfilled entirely, it does feel as if one milestone has been reached.

Notes

References to Ruskin's published works are taken from *The Works of John Ruskin*, Library Edition (1903–1912), ed. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, 39 vols, London: George Allen; New York: Longmans, unless otherwise stated. They are indicated by volume and page number in the text, thus: (5:187).

- (1) Hajime Ogino, "The Artist as the Beholder: John Ruskin's Modern Painters", Bulletin of Oita Prefectural College of Arts and Culture, Vol. 55 (2018), pp. 141-154.
- (2) Geoffrey F. DeSylva, *John Ruskin's Modern Painters I and II: A Phenomenological Analysis*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI Research Press, 1981, pp. 5, 34. Furthermore, Ruskin himself also attacks the idea of subjectivity and objectivity as representing a dichotomy in *Modern Painters* III, using the example that the color blue is a power of the senses which is intrinsic to an object, and exists separately from one's conscious perception of it, and that the perception is simply a validation of this fact at the level of awareness.
- (3) Hans H. Hofstätter, Symbolismus und die Kunst der Jahrhundertwende, Köln: DuMont, 1978, p. 79.
- (4) Ibid., pp. 79-80.
- (5) George P. Landow, *The Aesthetic and Critical Theories of John Ruskin*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 49.
- (6) Hajime Ogino, "Reconsidering John Ruskin's 'Imagination Contemplative'", *Bulletin of Oita Prefectural College of Arts and Culture*, Vol. 56 (2019), pp. 253–262; Hajimé Ogino, 《L'esthétique de John Ruskin: le développement de la conception de "l'imagination"》, *LITTERA* (Société Japonaise de Langue et Littérature Françaises), n° 5 (2020), p. 35–48.
- (7) Denis Huisman, L'esthétique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961, p. 49.
- (8) Pater, both as an artist and as a viewer, would first take the position of the viewer, and aimed to describe works in a way which would allow those reading the critique to experience that moment as he had. See also the following description: "'To see the object as in itself it really is,' has been justly said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in æsthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly. [......] With this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch." (Walter Pater, "The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry", *The Works of Walter Pater*, Library Edition, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1910, pp. viii, 237.)